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 Europe’s Losses of Innovation: 
The Individual as well as Societal Harms1 
Edmund Phelps 
Estimates presented here reveal large losses in indigenous innovation 
among several European nations that were relatively dynamic. I refer to 
France, which had lost almost all of its innovation by 1980; to Italy, which 
by 1990 lost all of the innovation that it briefly had in the ‘60s and ‘70s – its 
Economic Miracle; and to Germany, which, after regaining in postwar 
years its rank in innovation (below France but a little above the UK and 
Italy), slipped back considerably in the ‘70s. The UK had lost considerable 
innovation from the late ‘50s to the end of the ‘70s, but regained much of 
that in the late ‘80s and the‘90s. Austria, Holland and Spain had little 
innovation to lose. My thesis is that the large losses – and the narrowing of 
the scope for innovating – have serious ill-effects on society and acute ill- 
effects on a wide range of individuals. What were these ill-effects? 
Recall that the innovations in an economy are contributors to gains in its 
productivity – to “total factor productivity,” which is a weighted average of 
labor productivity and capital productivity.2 The magnitude of the 
innovation going on is measured by the size of the productivity gain 
attributed to it. So, by definition, a “loss” in annual indigenous innovation 
causes a loss of just that size in annual productivity growth. The incidence 
of such a productivity slowdown is determined by its effects in markets: It 
slows the growth of wage rates, and as they fall relative to household 
wealth, the supply of labor is contracted; and it slows business investment, 
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which contracts the demand for labor. It also depresses interest rates, which 
hurts younger workers. So employment levels become naturally depressed – 
without any “deficiency of aggregate demand.” In standard models, both 
developments reduce “economic welfare.” 
I note in passing that this set of effects from a productivity slowdown 
does not differ much from the “secular stagnation” that Alvin Hansen was 
talking about as early as 1934 – years before Keynes’s General Theory 
(1937). “[W]hen the volume of savings outruns technological 
development,” he wrote, “investment in new capital falls … creating 
business stagnation.”3 Stagnation results when productivity slows down or 
accumulated wealth speeds up. Now working-age population is stagnating! 
True, international trade and investment flows serve to moderate such 
developments. Decades ago, Paul Samuelson of MIT found some theoretical 
conditions for “factor price equalization,” but they did not hold empirically. 
Later, Zvi Griliches of Harvard suggested that Europe escapes the costs of 
reducing its indigenous innovation through technological transfer. “The 
Europeans are so smart,” he wrote. “[T]hey let the Americans take the risks 
of innovation, then they copy each year the new products that were 
successful."4  Of course, the Europeans might manage in this way to have 
the productivity growth rate of the US, but its productivity level would have 
fallen behind the US level. However, the Americans later suffered their own 
sharp productivity slowdown around 1970. As a result, the European 
countries losing much of their indigenous innovation also lost much of the 
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overseas innovation they would otherwise have been able to “import” from 
overseas. No wonder their productivity growth fell very heavily. 
It is also true that some European nations still suffer to varying degree 
from the financial crisis on top of the damage from the secular stagnation. 
We ought to put this damage in proper perspective, though. Yes, business 
investment as a ratio to the GDP in the EU fell from 7.5 % in 2000 to 5.7% 
in 2014, a fact Joseph Stiglitz dug out recently.5 But business investment, 
even after its decline from the mid-‘70s as the productivity slowdowns were 
taking hold, fell more over the next 15 years: in Italy from 15.7% in 1980 to 
11.3% in 1995, and in France from 13.0% in 1980 to 10.9 in 1995.6 Other 
measures say the same. The employment-to-population ratio among men in 
Italy dropped from around 77% in the early 2000s to around 73% in 2014. 
But it declined deeply from 87% in the late ‘70s – when innovation began 
dying – to 77% around 2000. The labor force participation rate in France 
dropped significantly from 87.6% in 2000 to 83.8% in 2014. But the decline 
was greater from 93.3% in the benchmark year 1973 to 86.6% in the late 
1990s.7 Interestingly, in Germany the employment-population ratio started 
the ‘70s at 92%, then lost some ground in the ‘90s with German unification, 
but climbed back to 89% in 2014 – not far below the level in the ‘70s. 
Do the brighter statistics in Germany and for that matter the UK put the 
theory in question? No. The UK’s estimated annual innovation is higher in 
the recent span 1972-2013 than in the previous span 1946-1972, so from 
5 
The data over the latter span are those given in Joseph Stiglitz, “What’s Wrong with Negative 
Rates,” Project Syndicate, April 14, 2016. 
6 
Data from OECD, Private Non-Residential Investment as a percentage of nominal GDP. 
7 
For Italy, see the OECD statistics portal at www.oecd.org, men ages 15-64. For France, see 
OECD, Employment Outlook, July 1996, Table B, p. 188, men ages 25-64. Regarding France, 
data on the employment-to-population ratio of men for the 1970s are not available. They go back 
to 1980. The employment-population ratio in France fell from around 82% in 1980-84 to about 





this perspective it comes as no surprise that Britain is doing better, not 
worse. And Germany is the continental European country with the smallest 
loss of innovation from the earlier span to the later span. 
From these data and other data I infer that the losses of innovation in 
Europe have brought appreciable declines, relative to trend, both in wage 
rates available to ordinary workers (relative to trend) and in interest rates 
available to savers from the ‘70s well into the ‘00s. (Population slowdowns 
may have contributed to the declines.) These developments have led to 
heavy reductions in most people’s incomes and wealth – relative to past 
trends – and in labor force participation rates. The developments mean 
diminishing opportunity. People are forced to take less preferred paths of 
consumption and leisure. 
All that is about the private sector. What about the public sector? The 
great slowdowns brought slowdowns of government revenue, which in turn 
led to budgetary deficits that are endemic and seemingly endless. The 
beneficiaries of social insurance and social assistance are threatened. 
Moreover, the slowdown malady that has hit the once-dynamic nations of 
continental western Europe is bringing political uncertainty about what can 
be done and will be done; and this may bring political instability. 
Note that these ill-effects of the losses in innovation – the “diminishing 
opportunity” and the public sector problems – are societal. The social 
benefit cutbacks are everyone’s cutbacks. The slowdown of the general 
level of wages is everyone’s slowdown. But a great many people earn 
rewards from economic life that are not societal. These rewards are very 






As some observers have said – Kenneth Boulding, Tony Blair, Mitt 
Romney … – a person may value “attainments”: attaining things through 
one’s own effort and talent. I’ve used the word prospering (from the Latin 
pro spere, meaning as hoped, or according to expectation) to refer to the 
experience of succeeding in one’s work: a craftsman’s gratification at seeing 
his hard-earned mastery result in better work or better terms for the work he 
does, a merchant’s satisfaction seeing “his ships come in,” or a scholar’s 
sense of validation from being awarded an honorary degree. By mid-19th 
century, an English (male or female) might speak of “getting on,” meaning 
getting somewhere. Even when their ventures failed, they felt good that they 
were “taking control” of their lives.8 
Various scholars – Thorsten Veblen, John Dewey, Abraham Maslow… – 
speak of a person’s satisfactions from using his or her ingenuity and 
knowledge – his/her workmanship – to solve problems. A person who over 
a career has the pleasure of developing such capacities is said to be 
experiencing personal growth, or “self-realization.” Though John Rawls did 
not adopt this view – the workers in his model have only the wage that 
society determines – he acknowledged that view at the end of his great 
book.9 
Lastly, several of the greatest writers and philosophers – 
Montaigne and Voltaire, Cervantes and Shakespeare, Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche – portray a full life – a life of richness – as a personal journey 
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into the unknown marked by interior struggle, the fascination of 
uncertainty and the excitement of “acting on the world.” That sort of life 
is often what is meant by the term flourishing. 
Obviously, to have such engaging lives, working-age people need 
more than a secure job at the going wage – work that keeps them busy 
but gives them little or no autonomy. They need to have human agency – 
to be able to take the initiative, to express their thoughts and explore new 
paths.10 
What sort of economy might offer – to a large degree, at any rate – 
all this prospering, growing and flourishing? Clearly it must be an economy 
in which the actors are exploring, theorizing, imagining, creating, testing 
and discovering. I’ve argued that several Western nations, mostly western 
European nations, developed in the 19th century just such an economy: an 
economy full of entrepreneurial people – people alert to unnoticed 
opportunities: searching for better ways of doing things, and exercising 
their initiative to try out new things; – and an economy full of innovative 
people – people imagining new things, developing new concepts into 
commercial products and methods, and marketing them to potential. The 
innovation in the enterprise sector was pervasive – stretching across most 
industries – and it was inclusive – rising from society’s grassroots. You 
feel the enthusiasm in Lincoln’s “young America,” in Harold Evans’s tales 
of innovators, Emma Griffin’s trove of English diaries and Gershwin’s “An 
American in Paris.” They evoke lives of agency and resulting richness. 
In the economies that have lost so much dynamism – most acutely, 
Italy and France – this life of richness seems to me to have largely slipped 
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away: It’s available to fewer and fewer. This loss is very serious – far worse 
than the slowdown of wages and the fall of interest rates. The fact that Italy 
and France are at the bottom in “job satisfaction” is, for me, evidence that 
the Italians and French badly need more engaging careers. 
What is at stake in continental Europe is not so much a return to rapid 
productivity growth and thus a tight labor market – though consumption and 
leisure are obviously important to people. What is at stake is a broad return 
to modern life. 
